Not many are aware that over the past few months, an addition was made to the community of nations when the Parliament of the tiny Serbian province of Kosovo declared independence from Serbia. This was a widely-expected move, which nevertheless gave cause for a new showdown between the West and a resurgent Russia, over their overlapping spheres of influence in eastern Europe.
But first, a brief historical background: Once upon a time, there was a country called Yugoslavia. The former Yugoslavia was a federation that included the Slavic nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. Amongst these nations, Serbia was the predominant one, with Kosovo being a province in the southern tip of Serbia. The Yugoslavian state was an artificial creation that was indirectly brought about by the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the turn of the 20th century. Previous to this, eastern Europe was an area of dispute between three empires - (1) Austro-Hungary, (2) Russia, and (3) the Turkish Ottoman Empire. Still before all of those, there ruled the Byzantine Empire dating back to the middle ages. This long history of conquest in eastern Europe resulted to migrations of ethnic populations within conquered lands, and this in turn accounts for the present multicultural and multireligious mix in the regions - even within separate national borders. It was unavoidable then that these displaced populations, usually marginalized by the predominant population, would have aspirations for self-rule. In the 20th century, the communist regime of Serbian strongman Josip Tito (with the indirect support of the Soviet Union) did much to moderate the independence aspirations of each of the Yugoslavian component nations. This however was entirely undone when Communism fell in the last decade, and the Slavic peoples under the Yugoslavian umbrella began to take up arms and resist what was perceived as an increasing domination by Serbia. This degenerated to the bloody Balkans conflict that occurred in the 1990s and extended into the first years of the 21st century.
While Serbian regimes adopted some resignation over the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, they reserved a vehement refusal for any notion of independence for Kosovo. The reason for this is that Serbians consider Kosovo as the ancient cradle of Serbian culture and civilization, and thus inseparable to the Serbian identity. It is perhaps the heavy-handedness of past Serbian leaders that fueled the discontent of Kosovo's ethnic Albanians (which account for over 90% of Kosovo's population.) The secession of the other Yugoslavian states encouraged them to demand for full-blown independence. This was no less helped by Serbian leaders such as Slobdan Milosevic, who have been accused of crimes against humanity in their brutal suppression of other ethnic groups within the former Yugoslavia. In the case of Kosovo, the use of violence of both Serbian and Kosovar sides, and the brutal one-sidedness of conflict, pushed NATO to intervene by means of devastating air strikes against Belgrade (Serbia's capital) to put a stop to the fighting. Later on, the UN entered the picture and enforced autonomous rule for Kosovo. For some years, this status quo was maintained, until finally, Kosovo simply declared independence upon realizing that the Serbian government was kept in check by NATO, the UN and world public opinion.
Now for the bigger picture: Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a power vacuum existed in areas formerly under its sphere of influence. In the case of eastern Europe, the resulting scenario gives us two pictures - (1) moves towards closer integration with the west, particularly the European Union; and (2) authoritarian rule within individual states, usually opposed to the west. The integration in the first scenario is economic, as much as it is political. The glaring disparity of economic conditions between eastern and western Europe was the impetus for some countries to seek economic integration. The intention is to share the wealth of the west that has long been hindered by enforced economic dependence on and by the Soviet Union. The political aspect of such integration, on the other hand, was brought about by the need to back up the democratization process by defense aid and cooperation with the west. A recent manifestation of this was the mad scramble towards NATO membership by former Warsaw Pact member-countries. The second scenario points to the fact that eastern Europe never really had a tradition of democracy. From ancient times, the area was ruled by authoritarian - and oftentimes despotic - rulers. The brief flowering of democracy after the fall of Tsarist Russia was quickly supplanted by the westward expansion of Communist Russia, and this is the reason why the norm is actually still oriented towards authoritarianism. The present-day incursions of western powers in this area, with its ideas of democracy and liberalism, is seen by the local rulers as an attack on their authority over their subject peoples. Thus, their resistance to the west.
It is important to note that the two scenarios are not mutually exclusive, and could both exist within any eastern European state. In fact, it is more accurate to say that within each state, there are forces of integration and opposition with the West (in varying degrees from state to state.) This is the arena in which the West and the new Russia are now battling for influence. At first glance, there does not seem to be any difference between the east vs. west conflict during the Cold War and the one that is occurring today. After all, it's basically the same characters on each side - the US and western Europe on one side, and Russia with other former Soviet Union states on the other. There are however big differences. First, it is no longer a battle of capitalism vs. socialism/communism. For better or worse, that particular conflict was settled in capitalism's favor shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Today's Russia, while still a very formidable military power, is no longer the superpower that it was in the 20th century, nor is it an ideological bastion for socialism anymore.
The eastern European states under the Soviet sphere of influence previously formed a buffer against the west which was strategic to Soviet socio-political interests. Russia's relative weakening after the dissolution of the Soviet Union left the west free to make bold incursions into integrating these states into its own socio-political framework. In many cases, the receptiveness to the west is not purely brought about by a willingness to adhere to any political or economic system. For the smaller nations that got absorbed by bigger/more powerful ones under Soviet-era power setups, there was a strong drive for national self-determination. This was capitalized on by the west in the form of promised assistance in establishing and strengthening democratic institutions, if they allow themselves to be integrated into the western framework. It could be argued that these same nations also capitalized on the west's willingness to support them politically in order to advance their own respective interests. In the case of Kosovo, this give and take scenario is evident. Kosovo is one of the poorest areas in Europe. On one hand, Kosovo would gain much in securing for itself a stable economy and recognition of its independence. In exchange, Kosovo's addition will result to a wider socio-political network of friendly countries for Europe, which will enhance commerce and security for the west. In addition, there might be another dimension to the immediate western support and recognition for Kosovo's independence - and this concerns Russia.
By its nature, Russia's vast size and strength should be directly proportional to its preponderance over the region. This preponderance was realized (and in many ways exceeded) during both the Tsarist and Soviet eras, but was drastically reduced upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Racked by separatist conflict in Chechnya and internal problems in its bureaucracy, Russia was temporarily hindered from enforcing it's traditional sphere of influence, not just in eastern Europe but also in central Asia. The precariousness on Russia's status emboldened the west to make moves towards integrating as many countries as it can from behind the former Iron Curtain. There was a notion that Russia's troubles were only temporary, and that once it regains its former status, the opportunity to integrate countries formerly under the Soviet sphere would be lost forever . The observed intention was to gain an irreversible foothold in eastern Europe to check Russia's influence in the region - which has traditionally been at variance with western interests. Today, the former buffer is now peppered with states that are friendly to the west. By virtue of the foothold gained, the west would now have more leverage against Russia in case the latter resists moves towards further integration of eastern Europe. Kosovo is a case in point. Russia could do no more than protest diplomatically the dismemberment of its staunch ally when western states immediately gave recognition to Kosovo's independence.
In addition, one way to indirectly weaken a dominant state is to destabilize its allies. The former Yugoslavia was a relatively independent and formidable ally of Russia under the Soviet bloc due to its core Serbian constituency. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Serbia remained a staunch ally of Russia. Any opportunity to destabilize or weaken Serbia was then welcomed as a strategic opportunity to further weaken Russia's hold on the states in its western frontier. This opportunity presented itself with Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence. From Russia's point of view, the west's foreign policy thrust into eastern Europe is nothing more than state-level sheep stealing from its sphere of influence, taking advantage of Russia's temporary weakness following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Understandably the loss of the buffer zone to its former enemies is no less strategically harmful to Russia now, as it was then. During the Cold War, the bipolar power set up actually encouraged world stability in the sense that what happened on one side of the Iron Curtain had absolutely no effect on the other. With the eastward push of the west, any elbow room that Russia once had in advancing its own interests in the region is becoming smaller.
Aside from Russia and Serbia, there are also other countries that oppose the recognition of Kosovo's independence on entirely different grounds. For example, Cyprus, Spain and the Philippines withhold recognition on the ground that it might set a dangerous precedent for the treatment of separatist movements within their own respective borders. The situation in Cyprus, for one, is very delicate. The entire island-nation has been divided evenly into two sides ever since Greek-speaking Cypriots attempted to have the whole country absorbed into Greece - thereby prompting Turkey to intervene militarily to protect Turkish-speaking Cypriots from forced assimilation, or even exile. If the Kosovo example were to be adopted as established doctrine (wherein the UN mandate was simply disregarded), it is argued that there will be intensified efforts of separatist groups everywhere that will threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their host countries.
The situation in Kosovo is a test case on whether a new standard will be adopted in determining national sovereignty and international recognition thereof. It is a certainty that the ensuing debate will be affected (or even hindered) by the geographic location of the particular area that desires independence. For example, the strategic location of Kosovo makes it liable for the independence question to be sublimated to the clashing interests in the region of more powerful neighbors, such as Russia and the west. This level of interference will not be as disruptive in the case of a less-strategic area, such as the part of Sri Lanka held by the Tamil Tigers, or even the parts of Mindanao held by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. In any case, the ongoing dynamic between (1) clashing regional interests, (2) the eroding authority of the UN, and (3) the basic right of self-determination by minorities will likely prolong this debate. In the long run, however, we can expect the debate to expand to the larger area on the relevance of international institutions in the face of the propensity of all states - weak or strong - to take unilateral action without fear of censure or reprisal from those same institutions. At the end of it, it's likely that an entirely new international system will emerge which will be characterized not so much by the idea of a centralized world arbiter-government (like what the UN is now), but instead by movements based on the presence and absence of power and/or conflicts between powers.
If this situation ever materializes, this is essentially a reversion to Bismarck's realpolitik that characterized international relations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Only time will tell though if this system will degenerate into the same political doomsday machine that preceded and ultimately led to the First World War. Incidentally, the spark that began that war occurred in the Balkans - exactly the same place where Kosovo is located.
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